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Crash Programme

In an article in *The Daily Telegraph* on November 9, 1965, Colin Welch thus describes the current educational situation in England: "Swollen and riotous classes; overworked, underpaid, harassed and browned-off teachers; in particular not nearly enough staff qualified to teach sixth forms; grim, shabby, ruinous, inadequate or even insanitary buildings; buckets for lavatories, frozen heating pipes or none; curtained-off bits of dining halls used as classrooms: if we just harped on this sort of thing, an approving chorus would approve the dirge of complaint."

Against this background of educational squalor the British Prime Minister clamours for a crash programme in Rhodesia to educate the African Rhodesians to a point where they can qualify to vote on an adult suffrage basis.

For thousands of years the Rhodesian area of central Africa remained completely undeveloped, inhabited by warring tribes, and subject to Arab slave-raids and endemic disease. In 1890, on the basis of a concession obtained from a tribal chief, 200 white settlers with 700 police built Fort Salisbury which in the following 75 years has become the modern and beautiful city of Salisbury, capital of (Southern) Rhodesia. In this same period railways and roads (of which there were none before) have been built, endemic disease has been brought under control and in some cases eradicated; the mining of valuable minerals has been established and expanded, and agriculture developed. Yet even after thirty odd years, the white population had reached only about 35,000, and the subsequent expansion to the present 220,000 was by British government-encouraged immigration with the promise of a bright and prosperous future.

In 1954 there were more than 2,300 government and mission schools for Africans, as against 139 for European Rhodesians; and a multi-racial university in Salisbury.

By the early 1960's, 15% of the African population were pupils, as against 14% of the Europeans. Six times as many teachers teach Africans as teach Europeans, and their classes are twice as large.

Considering the world-wide difficulty in getting or training teachers, what the European Rhodesians have achieved in an originally undeveloped country in 75 years is fantastic. And what is certain is that European teachers teaching the Africans are not doing it because it is the only way they can earn a living.

Now, what is a 'crash' programme of educating the African Rhodesians? Go at twice the present rate? To do so would require another 15,000 odd teachers, and perhaps another thousand schools—probably more. There are immense problems of communication, provision of text-books, and language. African students at present number over 600,000, the majority of whom are born into a tribal environment, totally different in structure and tradition from the European, where a sophisticated language, the very basis of education, is learned with the imbibing

of mothers' milk. A European child starts school with a *basis* of education already acquired; but most African children, at this stage of African development, are virtually alingual from an educational point of view. Their native languages are incapable of expressing the concepts of civilisation, let alone of a modern technological society, which is what the Europeans are endeavouring to train them to become.

So much for the merely physical side of a 'crash' programme. A recent book (1965) by Dr. Thomas Molnar, *Africa—A Political Travelogue**, brings out many other aspects of the situation. Dr. Molnar travelled widely in Africa with the express intention of informing himself, free from pre-conceptions or political views, of current developments in that country, talking to and mixing with Africans, Europeans, and Coloureds. He has written an immensely interesting and informative book. One crucial fact which he observed was the difference in *temperament* between the Europeans and the Africans. The latter are, in the main, unambitious. They can be taught good farming, but they are not fundamentally anxious to practise it. Political ambition, of course, is another matter. Educated Africans are only too anxious to acquire political power, and with it motor-cars, palatial buildings, and international travelling. Yet where they have it, and where European influence and perseverance are diminishing, the jungle is returning to the cities: streets cracking, buildings deteriorating, weeds appearing—a general loss of momentum.

Life in a great deal of tropical Africa is a steady struggle against the prolific forces of nature, in a way undreamt of in temperate climates. And if there is anything in the theory of evolution as applied to man, what has evolved in Africa is a type of being adapted to living *with* the jungle, rather than in perpetual struggle against it.

Massive education of Africans is an *experiment*, and quite possibly a dangerous experiment. For in the end it may drive the European from Africa, and then be faced with an insuperable temperamental barrier to maintaining the complex institutions of an imposed civilisation, and thus of a total collapse and reversion. And this would deny to the world the massive resources of Africa on which the whole world is now dependent.

Of course, the Communist Conspiracy knows this, but Mr. Harold Wilson, whose thinking is ideological, probably does not. The problem is biological, not ideological. Things which are not as they ought to be can only seldom be made as someone thinks they ought to be. If it is possible to bring civilisation and self-government to all Africa, it will probably be by some form of selection over several generations producing a sufficient number of temperamentally suitable Africans to carry on a task far more formidable than the government of the United Kingdom.

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FROM WEEK TO WEEK

We have repeatedly emphasised Douglas's observation that the disastrous course of events is either the outcome of sheer inability (in which case we have no hope), or of conspiracy, implying immense ability and a cold grasp of objectives. But at the service of conspiracy there are now an enormous number of people who in practical effort amount to idiots. They are the products of a skilfully contrived mis-education, which has brought them to positions of power and influence, where their actions, springing from theories rather than reality, are leading us to apparently irrevocable catastrophe, and at an accelerating rate.

An article in a recent issue of *U.S. News & World Report* carefully examines the project of placing men on the moon, and returning them safely to earth. To do so would require the absolute conjunction of so many split-second factors as to make success highly improbable. Yet a large number of highly intelligent people are engaged on this project. The trouble is, that for some reason, they are deluded. They are wasting immense resources and efforts which could be devoted to projects for the immediate benefit of mankind. After several more years, they may even get to the point of making the attempt at the moon project, and lose a few men into distant space.

The political ideologues, however, are engaged on far more immediately practical objectives, whose achievement is likely to lead to the death of millions, and the perpetual enslavement of the remainder. Western policies, more and more derived from socialist premises, thoroughly and for a long period promulgated through such institutions as the London School of Economics, have visibly furthered Communist objectives. In the twenty years since the war, Britain could have become immensely more wealthy and secure than ever in history, with a cohesive Commonwealth policy and an integrated economic policy. But the policy pursued was progressive internationalism, trading for an export surplus, and fantastic and quite unnecessary taxation. The result has been that world opinion more and more regards the United Kingdom with contempt.

At this time, it is no use arguing about the theory of economics. Twenty and more years ago, Douglas argued what the

effect of applying Keynesian economics would be; but now we are faced with the result he foresaw. The British citizen in England at least is immensely worse off, in realistic terms, than he was at the end of the last century. TV and motor-vehicles do not compensate for the effective enslavement of the individual today, nor for the loss of the pax Britannica, which increasingly benevolent, could have brought about far greater advancement of the peoples of the world than we see now.

Our ideological politicians are in effect, but most probably not in intention, traitors. Their actions have led and continue to lead, to the destruction of Western Christian civilisation.

An Outpost No More

Civilisation advances by assumptions—one rung of this ladder, for instance, is that we do not eat each other. I had taken it that fratricide and parricide were also left behind, but the *New Christian* (Nov. 4, 1965) has changed that and castigates the idea that we should not "deal firmly" with our kith and kin—the White Rhodesians—as "a blatant expression of the racialism which underlies the present crisis." I had thought that the qualifications for the suffrage had something to do with the crisis.

I wrote the above before U.D.I., nevertheless we still see the same shades of opinion as appeared before the event. Lord Salisbury speaks for one section, who are not so ill-informed, while the British Council of Churches requests that the British Government should "resume their responsibilities", as one member expressed it. Yet David Edwards, writing in the *New Christian* itself, says, "a council of disciples of the Prince of Peace ought to hesitate very long indeed before urging military action, probably in effect civil war." He was explaining that the British Council of Churches' resolution did not explicitly mention the use of force.

The Archbishop of Canterbury, said to be surprised at the reactions to his words, was asked by Mr. Kee on television whether he was referring to the British Government's possibly having to take over the Government of Rhodesia and then use force to defend its authority. He replied, "In the last resort it is necessary for a police law-and-order use of force by Christians in order to forestall and prevent terrible other violence." This does not go so far as my correspondent's suggestion of resuming responsibilities.

Some facts have not been brought into the open during the arguments. One of these facts is the menace of communism and the general "UNO" connivance to expel British and Europeans from Africa, so that the continent may be abandoned to chaos and to the invasion of communism. The Rhodesians, unlike the Americans of 1776, stood as Britons who were defending their land from subversion. Indeed the Bishop of Mashonaland (the Right Rev. C. W. Alderson) said that the use of force "would lead to appalling consequences." (*Church Times*, Nov. 5, 1965)

The communists stood to gain either way, either by over hasty extension of the franchise or by U.D.I., and they must have only feared that Messrs. Smith and Wilson might reach some agreement, which they may have considered improbable. The idea of "one man one vote" has indeed been wrenched out of its context, for it was a very late stage in the British development. We have heard of the American tobacco interests, but all too little of that body—ruthless and immoral—who wish to gain a footing in Rhodesia at any cost.

—H.S.

Western Response

IN THE SPRING 1965 ISSUE OF THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS *Orbis* WHICH IS PRODUCED BY THE FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, THERE IS AN ARTICLE ENTITLED 'STRATEGIC ASYMMETRICS' BY DR. WILLIAM R. KINTNER AND STEFAN T. POSSONY WHICH OBSERVES IN PART:

The irrationality of the American view of conflict in general, and the Cold War in particular, makes the United States fertile soil for psychological warfare. Americans tend to regard conflict merely as an interlude in the normal course of foreign affairs (peace and economic cooperation). Because the notion that international strife and war are continuing phenomena is repugnant, they succumb easily to concepts and programmes which prescribe painless cures for the ills of international life. Curiously, the vicissitudes of the Cold War are even more irritating than actual conflict itself. Although the attitudes of European nations toward war and peace have differed considerably from those of the United States in the past, the peoples of Western Europe today not only share many American illusions but, in fact, are increasingly attracted to them.

At the same time, Western propaganda efforts and the record of life under free governments have had a considerable impact upon the popular psyche in the Soviet Union. Soviet vulnerability to psychological penetration is far greater than the Western effort to exploit it. In fact, the exposure of many Soviet and satellite citizens to Free World ideas and achievements troubles Soviet leaders because it engenders pressures for reform which may weaken the communist system.

But Soviet psychological warfare messages find a far greater echo in the Free World than American messages find within the Communist world. Propaganda themes suggested by Moscow are often taken up by the Western press. Western leaders sometimes pick up topics suggested by Moscow and discuss them within the framework of the original propaganda theme. The widespread use of the term peaceful coexistence is an apt illustration. Many nations in the Free World have adopted peaceful coexistence as a principal political objective. However, the Leninist meaning of this term signifies mobilising the masses and restricting the war-making capacity of the imperialists in order to gain time to complete the preparations for world revolution. A peaceful strategy is explicitly defined in Soviet documents as a strategy suitable for a specific phase of conflict. Only occasionally have the Communists admitted that peace and peaceful coexistence are not synonymous. Soviet propagandists, in presenting this term to both Communist and noncommunist audiences, have succeeded in conveying the *correct* meaning of their strategy to their fellow Communists and the *opposite and false* meaning to noncommunists.

The psychological dexterity is not matched in the Free World. It seems that the success of Communist psychological warfare is unfortunately facilitated by the freedom of speech in the West and by unconscious cooperation of Western audiences with Communist propagandists—the Westerners' inability to detect and counter hostile propaganda renders them easy prey.

Among the least understood techniques of Soviet conflict operations are those of neutralisation by paralysing ideas. Indeed, the most effective type of psychological warfare is not the inducement of large numbers of people to do certain things but to *prevent them from doing those difficult and costly things they ought to do for their own safety*. An operation designed to

achieve the neutralisation of groups who do not comprehend the significance of the conflict or who are torn between diverse assessments of its nature is an assignment an efficient psychological warfare staff can handle with ease. Once a sufficient part of the target audience has been mentally neutralised, paralysis of action duly follows. The operation is facilitated if the conflict is lengthy and if the majority of the people, easily wearied by tensions, becomes accustomed to recurring failure. Defeatism sets in as doubts about the possibility of victory increase, and leads to advocacy of nonresistance.

It is not the purpose of this discussion to identify precisely the degree to which the Free World and the United States have, in this sense been neutralised and paralysed. The Free World has not yet been seriously harmed by Communist warfare, but the neutralisation battle has been virtually ignored by the West's political and intellectual leadership. Western policymakers should take cognisance of the dexterous use of psychological warfare which provides the Communists with an advantage vis-à-vis the West.

Conflict Doctrine

The Communists manage conflict in accordance with a doctrine embracing a peculiar and, in many respects, unique methodology of thought. The Sixth World Congress of the Communist International held in 1928 yielded what is probably the most authoritative statement of communist conflict doctrine. This document is ignored by practically all American experts, some of whom are apparently unaware of its existence, while others assume that it is no longer relevant. The Communists have, of course, assimilated new ideas into their thought since its publication, but it does provide a general philosophical basis for the rationale of Soviet operations.

The Soviets have developed a body of strategic thought that is far richer in content and far more responsive to the requirements of modern conflict than any doctrinal thinking in the Free World. At the risk of oversimplification, it may be suggested that the United States, at best, has only a military doctrine and lacks a counterpart to the Soviet doctrine of conflict as an organic whole. American doctrinal thinking is linear, while Soviet conflict thinking is dialectic. Our doctrine is highly abstract, while the Soviets combine abstraction with concreteness. Where we tend to ignore historical experiences and to reason in a narrow time span, the Soviets make a major effort to master historical depth. We are devoted to case studies; the Soviets cultivate these while devoting themselves also to the theory of political, social and economic change. The Soviets pay the greatest attention to social forces, to psychological operations, and to the integration of violent and nonviolent means of struggle under one informing idea: the entire conflict must be waged as a political struggle. By contrast, we tend to divide our military doctrine among the services. Thus far we have proved incapable of combining violent and nonviolent methods. We appreciate the role of economic factors, but we tend to ignore social forces and psychological processes.

The Soviets understand the dialectical character of modern conflict with its interplay of many different forms of war, revolution and uprisings, as well as economic, psychological and political warfare. Whereas they insist on political control, the United States demands civilian control. In the Soviet scheme, technical military decisions are generally made by military professionals, although the party occasionally decides on technical questions. The professional expert, i.e., the political conflict manager, integrates all conflict operations and tailors a particu-

lar mix of specific techniques and arms to a particular situation.

To the Western mind, there may be an unbridgeable contradiction between launching a war in Korea and at the same time, launching the Stockholm Peace Appeal. Such apparently contradictory action emerges from the dialectical conflict thinking which is so alien to the Western mind infatuated with legal definitions of war and peace. The West's inability to come to grips with dialectical thinking may also be illustrated by its difficulties in comprehending the complexity of surprise. If Americans, for example, think about surprise, they usually assign to this term the precise meaning of a sudden unexpected military attack but devote little attention to technological, organisational and political surprise. Nor do Americans show particular interest in such techniques as concealment, camouflage, secrecy and deception, through which surprise can be attained. In fact, the overall method by which the Soviets wage conflict is baffling to most Americans.

The United States has found it especially difficult to recognise deception. It can be safely assumed that most U.S. decision-makers, although aware of the potentialities of tactical deception, have given little serious thought to the notion of strategic deception and such techniques as mis-information and dis-information. Another basic weakness of American strategic doctrine has been our inability to recognise different phases along the conflict spectrum. For example, American planning for the so-called broken-back phase of war is virtually nonexistent, yet it is in this phase of conflict that victory might be achieved.

The doctrinal inferiority of the United States is high-lighted by the fact that strategy is not one of the crucial functions of its government. Even members of the National Security Council do not devote themselves exclusively to strategy; they are full-time administrators of vast departments and programmes. U.S. strategic thinking is the product of efforts by subordinate echelons. Decisions are made by top level administrators who do not always understand fully the conceptual relationship among military, political and economic strategies.

Strategy is an elusive art; it cannot be mastered by those, however talented, who come to it without thorough preparation. In the Soviet Union, strategy is the primary, and probably the principal, function of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. To illustrate, Gromyko is merely a diplomatic technician carrying out the policies of the Central Committee. Presidium members do handle administrative chores, but their administrative roles complement strategy. The strategy against an enemy is related intimately to the struggle for domestic political survival.

This steady preoccupation with strategy results in the singleness of purpose and the enormous determination of the communist leadership as a whole. The history of conflict teaches that of all factors, the will to victory is the most decisive. The Soviet leaders' dedication to victory, their strategic skill, their organisational structure, and the mental and psychological energy devoted to the struggle combine to make them superior in conflict techniques.

(The above extract is reprinted from the September 1965 issue of *East West Digest*, the journal of The Foreign Affairs Circle, Petersham, Surrey, England.)

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—From *The Observer*, Oct. 31, 1965.

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DESTALINISATION

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A TREATISE ON TREASON

This first appeared in serial form in "The Social Crediter" in June and July of this year. Titular governments in the West come and go, but the real government is continuous, and its decision have been consistently favourable to the advancement of communism. The members of the hidden government avoid the light of day, but this treatise indicates where to look for them.

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